about the selection of prepositions for implicative and factual predicates.

5 . In this paper we have considered some 'counterfactive' predicates. The analysis, however, is far from exhaustive, and especially studies of interpretations based on intonation contours are required for factual predicates in French and Spanish. Furthermore, examination of the relation between auxiliary elements and tense as well as between mood and tense should be pursued.

Notes

1 . A necessary and sufficient condition is 'showing enough skill and ingenuity in one's attempt' in the case of *manage*. (Karttunen, p. 352)

2 . Past tense in (3) is used as a modal with a counterfactual meaning and the proposition is concerned with a present thought: 'John is married.' Through the use of past tense, the speaker is 'distancing' himself from the propositional content of his utterance. (Taylor, p. 16) This matter will be discussed in section 3.

3 . *Feindre* pouvait s'utiliser sans préposition à l'époque classique. (*Feindre* could be used without a preposition in the classical age.) (Le Grand Robert)

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verbs of pretence (20h), (20i) a bare infinitive follows:

(20) a . Je me rappelle / souviens l'avoir rencontré.

(I remember [have] met him.)

b . Elle oublie avoir dit cela.

(She forgets [have] said that.)

c . J'admets / conviens l'avoir frappée.

(I admit [have] hit her.)

d . Il nie m'avoir trahi.

(He denies [have] betrayed me.)

e . Negó haberlo hecho. (Spanish)

(He denied [have] done that.)

f . Je regrette d'avoir dit cela.

(I regret [to have] said that.)

g . Siento / Lamento haberle dicho eso ayer. (Spanish)

(I regret [have] told you that yesterday.)

h . Elle feignait de³ dormir.

(She pretended [to sleep].)

i . El aparentó desvanecerse. (=6b) (Spanish)

(He pretended [faint].)

(20f) seems to be an exception and we have not yet found a plausible explanation. In English the corresponding verbs take gerunds.

Gerunds are apparently more 'nominal' than *to*-infinitives and we could conclude that French and Spanish bare infinitives following factive predicates are more 'nominal' than infinitives with *de*, *à* or *pour* in French and with *de*, *a* or *por* in Spanish, which refer to intended or expected actions. It is reasonable to regard presupposed past facts as 'nominal' and intended future actions as 'verbal'. So when used as implicatives, verbs meaning 'remember' and 'forget' take infinitives with *de*:

(21) a . Remember / Don't forget *to* call me.

b . Souviens-toi / N'oublie pas *de* me télephoner.

c . Acuérdate / No olvides *de* llamarme.

We have not yet collected a sufficient number of examples to make any hypothesis

Thirdly the combination of modal operators and perfective implies counterfactives.

(16)   a . The plane *was to have landed* at Heathrow, but it has been diverted to Gatwick.

   b . You *ought to have told* him that the paint on that seat was wet.

   c . John came home alone. You *shouldn't have let* him do that; he *might have got* lost.

Finally as Taylor has mentioned, intonation plays an important role to give a counterfactive interpretation. From (16c) we understand that 'John didn't get lost', which can be drawn from the context. However the sentence 'He might have got lost' can also refer to the past possibility just as 'He may have got lost' does. If the first auxiliary *might* is accented, we have a counterfactive interpretation.

Shown below is another pair of sentences with intonation contours.

(17)   a . John might have visited her in ˋhospital.

   b . John ˋmight have visited her in ˇhospital. (p. 19)

Perhaps John visited her in hospital in (17a), but (17b) with an accented *might* and a fall-rise tone on *hospital* means 'John didn't visit her' and the speaker thinks John could have done and should have done that.

Let us consider the following conversation.

(18)   A: This is John's fiancée.

   B: But I thought he was ˋmarried. (p. 1)

The speaker has thought until this moment that John is married. Getting new information, (18B) states that his thought is incorrect. Past tense in this case can be regarded as modality as Lyons suggested. The choice of present tense, not past tense, in its tag proves this:

(19)   a . I thought John was ˋmarried, isn't he?

   b . *I thought John was ˋmarried, wasn't he? (p. 9)

4 . In this section we will cast a glance at the types of infinitives the predicates discussed above take in French and Spanish.

As for factive / counterfactive verbs such as retrospective verbs (20a), (20b), verbs of acknowledgement (20c) and denial (20d), (20e), emotive verbs (20f), (20g) and

(12) J'ai manqué me noyer.

(I was almost drowned.)

(13) a . A car almost knocked him down.

b . Casi le atropella un coche.

In (10a) 'he didn't recognize her' though he should have done. Just like *manage*, the negation of the main verb in (10b) entails the negation of the subordinate clause, meaning 'this always annoyed her.' The French verbs *faillir* and *manquer* and the Spanish adverb *casi* can be considered as implicatives. The reason why a present indicative form is used with *casi* remains unanswered.

3 . In this section we will show that tense inconsistency indicates unfulfilled event or state.

Firstly unreal conditionals about the present are good examples of counterfactives.

(14) a . If only I *had* a lot of money.

b . Si j 'avais (IND) beaucoup d'argent.

c . ¡ Si yo *tuviera* (SUBJ) mucho dinero!

French takes imparfait and Spanish preterito imperfecto. All the sentences use past tense to refer to the state that 'I don't have much money now'.

Lyons (1977) considers the past tense as a modality:

Through his use of a past tense, the speaker is conveying his assessment of the likelihood of a proposition being true. (Taylor, p. 15)

In other words the speaker is creating the distance from the narrative point to show the falsity of the proposition.

Secondly in unreal conditionals about the past the main clause as well as the *if* clause includes tense inconsistency from the time axis.

(15) a . If it had been fine, I would / could / might have gone out.

b . S'il avait (IND) fait beau, je serais (COND) sorti.

c . Si hubiera (SUBJ) hecho buen tiempo, habría (POT) salido.

The *if* clause has past perfect forms, while combination forms of modal operators and perfective are used in the main clause: the conditional mood in French and potential mood in Spanish.

Mauriac, *la Pharisienne*)

(Brigitte feigned deafness, pretended not to understand any of the allusions.)

c . Il faisait comme si rien ne s'était passé.

(He pretended [as if] nothing had (IND) happened.)

(6)　a . El aparentó una enfermedad. (=4a)

　　b . El aparentó desvanecerse. (=4b)

　　c . El aparentó que había (IND) sucedido nada. (=4c)

English and corresponding French and Spanish sentences show that the counterfactive verbs take nouns, infinitives and clauses.

Counterfactive predicates presuppose the falsity of the complement and they do not seem to require subjunctive forms, which are used to describe the unreal situation in, for example, conditionals, in their subordinate clauses.

It may be interesting to present a slight difference in the choice of mood between French *comme si* and Spanish *como si*.

(7)　Il dort comme s'il était mort.

(He sleeps as if he was (IND) dead.)

(8)　María me trata (trataba) como si yo fuera su hija.

(María treat(ed) me as if I were (SUBJ) her daughter.)

Spanish appears to be strict in taking subjunctive forms for unreal conditions. French *comme si* often marks the counterfactivity without the tense inconsistency, as in:

(9)　Comme si tu sais tout!

(As if you know (IND) all!)

Tense inconsistency between the main and the subordinate clauses will be discussed in the next section.

Next we will present some implicative predicates such as *fail* and *almost* (*nearly*) and their French and Spanish equivalents.

(10)　a . He failed to recognize her.

　　b . This never failed to annoy her.

(11)　a . I nearly missed the train.

　　b . J'ai failli manquer le train.

　　　　b．John didn't manage to come.[1]

(3)　a．I thought John was married.

　　　　b．I didn't think John was married.

With a factive verb *regret* both (1a) and (1b) presuppose that John spent a lot of money on that project. Therefore negation in the main clause does not affect the presupposition expressed in the complement.

'The negation of a sentence with an implicative predicate implies the negation of its complement.' (Karttunen, p. 343) Using an implication verb *manage* (2a) implies 'John came,' and its negation (2b) implies 'John didn't come.'

Careful consideration must be given in treating a factual verb *think*. At first sight it appears to behave like implicatives, so with the main stress on *thought* (3a) implies 'John is married'[2] while (3b) implies 'John is not married,' when *think* is stressed. Putting a stress on an element in the embedded sentence, however, may cause the opposite implications. (3a) now implies 'John is not married' but (3b) implies 'John is married' when *married* in the embedded sentence has a main stress. Without mentioning the location of the main stress the person (the speaker in (3)) cannot be committed to the validity of a complement of factual predicates. Interpretations of implicatives as well as factives are unaffected by stress.

2．In the preceding section we saw the differences between 'factive', 'implicative' and 'factual' predicates. Now we will examine sentences whose predicates presuppose or imply the falsity of the complement.

　　Let us start with a counterfactive verb *pretend*.

　　　　If you pretend that something is the case, you act in a way that could make people

　　　　believe that it is the case, even though in fact it is not. (COBUILD)

We will see the syntactic characteristics of the verbs meaning pretence.

(4)　a．He pretended illness.

　　　　b．He pretended to faint.

　　　　c．He pretended that nothing had happened.

(5)　a．Il feignait une maladie. (=4a)

　　　　b．Brigitte faisait la sourde, feignait de[3] ne rien comprendre aux allusions. (F.

On 'Counterfactive' Predicates

Katsuko Takakuda

0 . There are various ways to suggest that a certain event did not take place or a certain state of affairs did not arise. This paper explores the predicates which presuppose or imply the falsity of the propositional content of their complement. We will take up three types of predicates (factive, implicative and factual) and try to find some properties of them.

1 . In this section we will give explanations of notions such as 'factive', 'implicative' and 'factual' predicates and see the differences between them in terms of negation.

Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) proposed the notion of factivity and claimed that 'the speaker presupposes that the embedded clause [of factive predicates] expresses a true proposition, and makes some assertion about that proposition.' (p. 348)

According to Karttunen (1971), 'an implicative main verb carries a presupposition of some necessary and sufficient condition which alone determines whether the event described in the complement took place.' (p. 340)

We differentiate factuality from factivity, using the sense suggested by Taylor (1984). 'Factuality concerns a person's (usually the speaker's) subjective assessment of whether the propositional content of a sentence or sentence fragment conforms or conflicts with his perception of reality, and is crucially dependent on the tense and polarity of the matrix verb.' (p. 1, p. 4)

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

(1)   a . John regretted spending a lot of money on that project.

　　　b . John didn't regret spending a lot of money on that project.

(2)   a . John managed to come.